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There is some evidence that patients with bipolar disorder recall more overgeneral than specific
autobiographical memories, a pattern widely reported in depression. However, there are also theoretical
arguments (Barnard, Watkins, & Ramponi, 2006) suggesting that experiential processing should
predominate during mania/hypomania, with an associated prediction of an increase in specific rather
than overgeneral memories. This hypothesis was explicitly tested using the Autobiographical Memory
Test (AMT). The specificity and speed of autobiographical recollection was compared for those with high
or low levels of hypomanic personality as indexed by the Hypomanic Personality Scale (HPS). High HPS
scorers recalled specific autobiographical memories in response to unpleasant cues more frequently and
faster than low scorers. These results provide partial support for the hypothesis, but only for unpleasant
cues.
Keywords: Hypomanic personality; Autobiographical memory; Bipolar disorder; Experiential processing;
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Bipolar disorder, which affects 1 1.5% of the
population (Bebbington & Ramana, 1995), is a
mood disorder characterised by repeated epi-
sodes of depression and mania or hypomania.
Mania includes symptoms such as elevated mood,
grandiosity, decreased need for sleep, pressure of
speech, flights of ideas, increased goal-directed
activity, and excessive involvement in risky activ-
ities (APA, 2000). Hypomania involves the same
symptoms but without significant impairment in
functioning. Hypomanic personality characteris-
tics, which can be found in healthy members of
the population, include being energetic, working
long hours with little sleep, and tackling numer-
ous commitments within the same time period
(Eckblad & Chapman, 1986). Hypomanic person-
ality is also associated with significant negative
outcomes, including higher rates of substance and
alcohol use, more depressive episodes, and lower
rates of engagement on work-related tasks
(Eckblad & Chapman, 1986; Krumm-Merabet &
Meyer, 2005; Meyer, Rahman, & Shepherd,
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personality were predictive of transition to bipolar
disorder and substance use disorders in a 13-year
follow-up study (Kwapil et al., 2000).
Individuals with mood disorders often exhibit a
broad range of cognitive deficits. For example,
impairments in memory, attention, visuospatial
function, and choice reaction time have all been
reported during mania and depression (Clark &
Sahakian, 2005). Previous research has demon-
strated that depressed patients named the colour
of depression-relevant words, such as ‘‘sadness’’
and ‘‘failure’’, on a Stroop task more slowly than
emotionally neutral words (Williams & Broad-
bent, 1986a). Following this, Bentall and Thomp-
son (1990) found that students who scored highly
on a hypomanic personality questionnaire also
had delayed reaction time for colour naming of
depression-related, but not euphoria-related,
words. These results appeared to indicate that
depressive processes may play a key part in the
vulnerability for bipolar disorder: a proposal
supported by the finding that depressive pro-
cesses can also be observed in bipolar patients
who are currently in remission (Scott, Stanton,
Garland, & Ferrier, 2000; Winters & Neale, 1985).
Dysfunctional beliefs are also thought to con-
tribute to the susceptibility for depression and
mania. According to Beck (1977), underlying
negative schemata distort cognitive beliefs about
the self and external events, which leads to
depressogenic thinking styles. Goldberg, Wenze,
Walker, Steer, and Beck (2005) compared the
dysfunctional cognitions of unipolar depressed
patients and bipolar manic or hypomanic patients
to a control group. The bipolar manic group rated
cognitions associated with mania, such as excite-
ment and risk taking, higher than both the
unipolar depressed group and controls. Although
these results suggest maladaptive attitudes may
be a risk factor for mania and hypomania, other
studies have found that both unipolar and bipolar
disorder groups show elevated levels of dysfunc-
tional thinking compared to controls, but do not
differ significantly from each other (Jones et al.,
2005; Lam, Wright, & Smith, 2004)
The extent to which memory functioning is
affected in depression has been a longstanding
issue (Blaney, 1986), and more recently some
attention has been directed at memory function-
ing in mania (see e.g., Clark & Sahakian, 2005;
Murphy & Sahakian, 2001; Quraishi & Frangou,
2002). Specifically, biases in memory recall that
may contribute to mood disorders have been of
interest,with particular reference to the specificity
of autobiographical recollection (Williams et al.,
2007).
Autobiographical memory is a form of hier-
archically organised episodic memory, containing
events that have occurred in a person’s life
(Conway, 1996; Conway & Rubin, 1993). It is
widely believed that mood state facilitates the
recall of mood-congruent memories. Conway and
Pleydell-Pearce (2000) argue that autobiographi-
cal memories are a fundamental component of
the experience of emotions and consist of three
hierarchical levels of specificity: lifetime periods,
general events, and event-specific knowledge
(ESK). Together these form an autobiographical
knowledge base. The broadest level of memory,
lifetime periods, consists of general thematic and
temporal knowledge of common aspects of a
distinct time period, e.g., ‘‘when I was in school’’.
The next level, general events, is more specific
and heterogeneous than lifetime periods. General
events encompass repeated and single events,
often featuring goal-attainment knowledge, which
form thematically related event clusters (e.g.,
‘‘when I play golf’’). Contextualised within the
general events is the most specific level of
memory, ESK. ESK often involves visual imagery
and is thought to be the defining feature of
memory vividness. Thus, according to this model,
specific knowledge is located within the wider
autobiographical system.
Researchers have found that during clinical
depression, autobiographical memory recall is
typically overgeneral (Park, Goodyer, & Teas-
dale, 2002; Williams & Broadbent, 1986b): mem-
ories only refer to general descriptions of events
rather than specific events and the associated
ESK. According to Conway and Pleydell-Pearce’s
model, this occurs because retrieval is stopped at
the general level. Once categories of information
have been recalled, the search for specific in-
formation is curtailed. This is argued to protect
the self from the threat of recalling negative self-
referring information. Additionally, Williams and
Scott (1988) suggested that overgeneral encoding
of memories may contribute to dysfunctional
recall during depressive episodes. If fewer specific
details are encoded, then fewer will be available
when recall is attempted.
An alternative explanation, the rumination
hypothesis, proposes that ruminative self-focus
upon symptoms and their consequences contri-
butes to and maintains the retrieval of over-
general memories during depression, thereby
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1996). In support of this claim, Park, Goodyear,
and Teasdale (2004) found that rumination in
adolescents with first-episode major depressive
disorder increased depressed mood and the recall
of overgeneral memories, whereas distraction
helped to minimise these symptoms. Therefore
overgeneral autobiographical memory recall is
both a symptom of depression and may also
exacerbate the condition itself.
One general account of the effects of mood on
memory focuses on representations of meaning
and how attention to meaning is allocated among
them. The Interacting Cognitive Subsystems
model of depression (ICS; Barnard & Teasdale,
1991; Teasdale & Barnard, 1993) suggests that
central executive functions are affected by bidir-
ectional interactions between two subsystems that
process different types of meaning: propositional
and implicational. The propositional subsystem
processes specific semantic relationships between
concepts. The implicational subsystem creates
abstract, generic, personal schematic models by
combining the products of processing current and
stored propositions, with the products of distal
and bodily sensations. These models are linked to
the experience of emotion. The ICS account of
depression holds that these states are linked to a
form of processing ‘‘interlock’’ where relatively
undifferentiated schematic models of the self are
continually regenerated in the dialogue between
these two levels of meaning. The interlocked state
is in part sustained because attention is predomi-
nantly focused at the propositional level of mean-
ing, with relatively little attention directed at
more extensive processing of schematic model
content. In contrast, it has been argued that manic
states are allied with attention to meaning being
predominantly focused on schematic model con-
tent (Barnard, 2004).
Evidence consistent with the wider proposal for
differential attention to two types of meaning in
normal healthy controls has been found both for
language comprehension tasks (Scott, Barnard, &
May, 2001) and for the attentional blink phenom-
enon (Barnard, Scott, Taylor, May, & Knightley,
2004). Further, in a computational model atten-
tion to these two levels of meaning derived from
ICS provides a good fit to the attentional blink
data where to be attended targets are semantic
categories (Su, Bowman, & Barnard, 2007).
Differential attention to two levels of meaning
has also been related to recollection of word lists
and to the specificity of autobiographical memory
retrieval (Ramponi, Barnard, & Nimmo-Smith,
2004). The theoretical argument is relatively
simple.
If the processing of specifically self-related
information were to be biased in favour of
attending to the implicational level, then relevant
schematic models would be easily accessed and
inter-related one to another, aiding comparison
with stored information. This experiential mode
of processing meaning would allow more detailed
and differentiated propositions to be generated,
thereby facilitating recovery of specific autobio-
graphical memories. In contrast, if attention were
biased to processing propositional meaning, then
an analytical and evaluative form of thinking
would prevail, focusing processing on examining
discrepancies between the current and desired
outcomes characteristic of rumination (Watkins,
2004). With attention focused predominantly at
the level of propositional meaning, interpretation
by the implicational subsystem proceeds rela-
tively automatically, with less inter-relating and
elaboration of schematic model content. This
would result in greater reliance on generic
relationships and, with that, fewer specific mem-
ories. In support of this, Ramponi et al. (2004)
report that both schematic model differentiation
and a ruminative response style predict specificity
of autobiographical recollection.
Barnard et al. (2006) further tested the role of
different modes of attending to meaning by
creating a normal analogue of rumination. The
generation of repeated, self-related, analytical
thinking was compared to a schematic, experien-
tial thinking style in healthy non-dysphoric con-
trols. Continually generating material on the
same self-related theme led to an increase in the
proportion of overgeneral memories compared to
specific memories. This result provided further
support for a possible causal role for analytical
self-processing in the production of overgeneral
autobiographical memories. This led Barnard
et al. (2006) to hypothesise that bipolar patients
experiencing a depressed episode would exhibit
overgeneral memory recall but would also display
reduced levels of overgeneral memory during
hypomanic episodes. It can be argued that, in
hypomania, attention would be predominantly
directed at implicational rather than proposi-
tional meanings. During this state, positive
self-models are often produced and assigned
extensive elaborative processing, creating what
amounts to a positive feedback loop between the
two levels of meaning (Barnard, 2004). With
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propositional meanings, discrepancies between
them would pass unnoticed, much as they do in
the ‘‘Moses illusion’’ (Erickson & Mattson, 1981).
Under these circumstances differentiated sche-
matic models would evolve with the potential to
increase the specificity of autobiographical mem-
ory retrieval.
Many studies investigating the specificity of
autobiographical memory recall have used the
Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT; Williams
& Broadbent, 1986b) in which participants recall
personal memories in response to positively and
negatively valenced cue words. However, very
few studies have investigated autobiographical
memory recall in bipolar disorder. Using this
method, Scott et al. (2000) reported higher levels
of overgeneral autobiographical memory in eu-
thymic bipolar patients compared with healthy
controls. These findings appear to coincide with
Barnard et al.’s (2006) prediction, as most
‘‘euthymic’’ bipolar patients have been found to
exhibit subsyndromal depressive symptoms (Judd
et al., 2003).
Mansell and Lam (2004) adapted the AMT to
use cue words specifically relevant to bipolar
disorder. They found that remitted bipolar pa-
tients recalled more general than specific mem-
ories, especially for a negative cue word,
compared to a remitted unipolar group and
healthy controls. Consistent with Conway and
Pleydell-Pearce’s (2000) suggestion that ESK
involves visual imagery, specific memories were
found to be more associated with images than
general memories. Although this seems to conflict
with Barnard et al.’s (2006) proposal that positive
self-models are produced during mania, both
Mansell and Lam’s (2004) and Scott et al.’s
(2000) studies assessed remitted individuals likely
to be experiencing significant levels of depressive
symptomatology.
Tzemou and Birchwood (2007) assessed the
autobiographical memory recall of participants
with bipolar disorder (two thirds in a manic
episode, the other third depressed) and unipolar
depression during an episode and after recovery,
to overcome the problems with controlling for
mood and illness phase. During episodes, bipolar
and unipolar groups demonstrated more over-
general recall than controls but did not differ
from each other. At the follow-up, the bipolar
group gave more specific responses to cue words
and the unipolar group gave fewer specific
responses to cues than during the original testing.
This pattern of results was mirrored when
responses to positively valenced cues alone were
considered. The groups did not differ for the
number of specific responses to the negatively
valenced cues. As the bipolar group included both
currently manic and depressed participants, these
results are unclear in relation to Barnard et al.’s
(2006) prediction. Participants who experienced
fewer traumatic intrusive memories produced
more overgeneral memories, suggesting that it is
the coping style used in response to the intrusions,
rather than the processing style, that may account
for the differences between bipolar and unipolar
disorders.
In addition to examining the proportion of
specific versus general autobiographical mem-
ories that are recalled, the AMT allows the speed
of memory retrieval to be investigated which
gives an indication of its availability. As the
AMT incorporates both positively and negatively
valenced cue words, comparing the latencies for
the recall of pleasant and unpleasant memories
could demonstrate which of these are more
accessible.
In an early study, Williams and Broadbent
(1986b) found that the depressed participants did
not show a speeded retrieval of negative mem-
ories, as would be expected when considering the
mood-congruency effect on memory recall (Teas-
dale, Taylor, & Fogarty, 1980), but rather demon-
strated a slowed retrieval of positive memories.
Williams and Scott (1988) found the same pattern
of results using participants with a diagnosis of
major depressive disorder. Similar results were
also reported in the seminal study by Lloyd and
Lishman (1975). They found a positive correla-
tion between the speed of recall for unpleasant
memories and severity of depression. However, to
date no studies have investigated the speed of
autobiographical memory recall in relation to
mania or risk for bipolar disorder.
Recent evidence using a simple question-an-
swering task and mood induction provides some
support for the likely adoption of a more sche-
matic and experiential mode of processing mean-
ing in patients with bipolar disorder (Lomax,
Barnard, & Lam, 2009). However, to the best of
our knowledge, there is currently no clear evi-
dence to support or refute Barnard et al.’s (2006)
hypothesis regarding specificity of autobiographi-
cal memory in bipolar disorder or hypomanic
personality. Additionally, no studies have looked
at the speed of recall in relation to either.
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participants at high behavioural risk of hypoma-
nia (Kwapil et al., 2000), as indicated by their
Hypomanic Personality Scale (HPS; Eckblad &
Chapman, 1986) score, will be compared to
participants with low levels of hypomanic person-
ality using the AMT to assess specificity and
speed of memory recall. The original AMT, which
comprises a series of emotional valenced cues,
will be utilised rather than Mansell and Lam’s
(2004) adapted test, with just one positive and
one negative cue word, as it allows for more
reliable analysis of the specificity and speed of
autobiographical memory retrieval. The use of
non-clinical participants helps to overcome the
problems associated with the effects of chronic
illness and medication, often apparent in clinical
samples. It also allows us to bypass any practical
difficulties associated with testing patients in a
full manic state where there may be many
concurrent cognitive impairments (Murphy &
Sahakian, 2001). Using an analogue sample does
mean that the results could only indicate possible
areas that may be useful to study in clinical
samples, rather than giving direct insight into
the processes involved in bipolar disorder. How-
ever, given that key characteristics in processing
are shared, the prediction from the ICS model
should nonetheless hold, with those at high
behavioural risk of hypomania being more biased
towards an experiential mode of processing
meaning and hence more likely to recover specific
autobiographical memories than those at low
behavioural risk of hypomania.
METHOD
Design
Stage one involved a web-based screening pro-
cess, using the HPS, to select participants. Two
groups were selected, those with a high risk of
developing bipolar symptoms (participants in the
top quartile of all HPS scores, HPS score]22)
and those with a low risk (participants in the
bottom quartile of all HPS scores, HPS score
512), forming the control group.
Stage two of the study employed a between-
groups experimental design involving two question-
naires and a memory test, with one independent
variable (bipolar risk) with two levels (high or
low). The dependent variable was the type of
autobiographical memories recalled (specific or
general).
Participants
In stage one an opportunity sample of 278
University of Manchester students, 75 male and
200 female (three undisclosed; mean age 21.25,
SD 4.83, range 17 49 years) were recruited via
email and completed an online HPS. Of these, 25
participants were excluded from the screening
process due to missing or repeated data.
Of the screened participants, 111 gave contact
details so that they could be invited to partake in
stage two of the study (57 high-risk and 54 low-
risk). Of these, 73 participants declined and 38
participants (21 high-risk and 17 low-risk) agreed
to participate in an experimental session. From
the high-risk group, 14 participants (4 male and 10
female; mean age 22.0, SD 4.90) were ulti-
mately recruited as 7 participants failed to attend.
From the low-risk group, 14 participants (2 male
and 12 female; mean age 19.64, SD 2.24) were
recruited as 3 participants failed to attend.
Materials
Hypomanic Personality Scale (HPS). The HPS
(Eckblad & Chapman, 1986) is a 48-item true 
false self-report measure of hypomanic person-
ality style, containing statements that are either
keyed true (‘‘I seem to be a person whose mood
goes up and down easily’’) or keyed false (‘‘I can
usually slow myself down when I want to’’) aimed
at identifying those at risk of developing bipolar
disorder. Eckblad and Chapman (1986) reported
that 78% of high HPS scorers met SADS-L
(Spitzer & Endicott, 1977) criteria for clinical
hypomania compared with none of the controls.
Individuals in late adolescence or early adulthood
with elevated scores on the HPS have also been
found to be at a heightened risk for DSM-IV
diagnosis of bipolar disorder in adulthood (Kwa-
pil et al., 2000). The HPS has a reported
coefficient alpha reliability of 0.87 in an under-
graduate sample and test retest reliability of 0.81
after 15 weeks (Eckblad & Chapman, 1986).
Internal States Scale (ISS). The ISS (Bauer
et al., 1991) is a 16-item self-report measure
gauging self-perceptions about mood state over
the past 24 hours, using a visual analogue scale
format to assess manic and depressive symptom
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along fifteen 100-millimetre lines running from
‘‘not at all, rarely’’ to ‘‘very much so, much of
the time’’ in response to statements such as
‘‘Today my mood is changeable’’, to give a single
summary of how they have felt over the last day.
The last statement to be responded to is ‘‘Today
I feel:’’ for which participants place an X along a
100-millimetre line labelled from ‘‘depressed/
down’’ to ‘‘normal’’ to ‘‘manic/high’’. The ISS
consists of four subscales measuring perceived
conflict, sense of well-being, depression index,
and activation level. The perceived conflict
subscale, comprising 11 items such as ‘‘Today
I feel irritable’’, measures the level of symptoms
present that could occur as part of either mania
or depression. The well-being subscale, including
three items, e.g., ‘‘Today I feel energised’’,
detects the presence of depression and is highly
correlated (r .73) with the Hamilton Depres-
sion Rating Scale (HDRS; Hamilton, 1960). The
depression index subscale, also highly correlated
with the HDRS (r .84), contains two items*for
instance, ‘‘Today I feel depressed’’*that deter-
mine the severity of depressive symptoms. Fi-
nally, the activation subscale, including five items
such as ‘‘Today I feel impulsive’’, correlates
positively (r .60) with the severity levels of
manic symptoms as assessed by the Young
Mania Rating Scale (YMRS; Young, Biggs, &
Meyer, 1978). The subscales have a coefficient
alpha for internal consistency of .81, .87, .92 and
.84, respectively (Bauer et al., 1991).
Autobiographical Memory Test (AMT).T h e
AMT (Williams & Broadbent, 1986b) is a verb-
ally administered memory test that measures the
tendency to recall either specific or general
autobiographical memories. This test uses a set
of 10 emotional cue words (taken from Robinson,
1976) to prompt autobiographical memory recall.
Of the 10 words, 5 are pleasant (‘‘happy’’, ‘‘safe’’,
‘‘interested’’, ‘‘successful’’, and ‘‘surprised’’) and
5 are unpleasant (‘‘sorry’’, ‘‘angry’’, ‘‘clumsy’’,
‘‘hurt’’ [emotional], and ‘‘lonely’’). Participants
recall a specific personal memory related to the
given word and then date when each memory
occurred. Recalled memories are categorised as
specific if the recalled event occurred at a
particular time and place and lasted for less
than a day. General memories are classified as
repeated events or events that lasted longer than
a day.
Procedure
The study was conducted in accordance with
ethical guidelines of the University of Manchester
following receipt of institutional ethical approval.
In stage one, participants were invited to take
part in the study via an email that directed them
to a webpage. Participants provided demographic
information and contact information (if they were
willing to participate in stage two), and completed
the HPS to enable selection of suitable high-risk
and low-risk groups for the second stage.
Screened participants were individually re-
called to complete stage two of the study.
Participants completed the ISS followed by the
AMT, which was verbally administered using the
instructions given by Williams and Broadbent
(1986b). Ten cue words were presented to parti-
cipants by the experimenter, alternating between
pleasant and unpleasant cues in a standard fixed
order (happy, sorry, safe, angry, interested,
clumsy, successful, hurt, surprised, lonely). Parti-
cipants were given 1 minute in which to recall a
specific personal memory in response to the word.
The latency to the first word of the response made
by the participant was recorded. If the recalled
memory was not specific, the experimenter gave
the prompt ‘‘Can you think of a specific time; one
particular episode?’’. This prompt was repeated if
the subsequent responses remained inappropri-
ately general. In this case, the cumulative time
(combining the first response time with the time
taken from the last word of the prompt to the first
word of the subsequent responses) was recorded.
This method of measuring the cumulative time
was used to avoid any confound with the time
taken by the experimenter in prompting partici-
pants whose original response was not specific. If
a specific memory was not recorded within the
minute, a time of 60 seconds was recorded and the
experimenter proceeded to the next item. After
all 10 cue words had been presented the experi-
menter provided each word again in turn and
asked the participant to date each of the mem-
ories as accurately as possible. If required, the
participant was reminded of the memory they had
recalled. These memories were coded, following
Barnard et al. (2006), according to how long ago
the memory took place on a 6-point scale: 1 
Less than a week ago, 2 Less than a month ago,
3 Less than three months ago, 4 Less than six
months ago, 5 Less than a year ago, 6 More
than a year ago. The responses given by the
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could be categorised after the experiment had
been completed. The timings and classification of
the memories for the AMT by the experimenter
were checked for reliability by an independent
rater using a random sample of approximately
10% of the responses for each measure.
Analysis plan
All data that were not nominal were tested for
deviation from the normal distribution using
Kolmogorov-Smirnoff tests. Parametric statistical
analyses were used where data were normally
distributed. Skewed data were normalised using
square root or log transformation. Where this was
not effective, non-parametric tests were applied.
Chi-square tests were used to analyse whether the
groups differed on the demographic variables.
Mann-Whitney U-tests and independent samples
t-tests were conducted to compare the groups on
the HPS and ISS measures. For the AMT,
reliability of the latencies that were recorded by
the experimenter and independent rater was
checked using Spearman’s rho correlations. The
mean latencies were compared using Mann Whit-
ney U-tests and agreement for memory classifica-
tion was checked using a chi-square test and
kappa test. To look for differences between the
groups on measures of autobiographical memory
recall one-way analyses of covariance, controlling
for the current mood symptoms that differed
between the groups (ISS perceived conflict and
activation scales), were used except where data
could not be normalised, in which case the Mann
Whitney U-test was employed. One data set,
corresponding to a high-risk participant’s re-
sponse to the cue word ‘‘Clumsy’’, was excluded
as the participant did not understand the meaning
of this word and therefore could not respond. The
dates given by each group for the recalled
memories were compared using independent
samples t-tests and Mann Whitney U-tests. All
tests were two-tailed.
RESULTS
Demographic variables
Table 1 shows the demographic variables (gen-
der, mean age, previous contact with mental
health services, and ethnicity) for the high-risk
and low-risk groups. The groups did not differ on
any of these variables.
The HPS scores were not significantly related
to age, gender, previous contact with mental
health services, or ethnicity. Only age related to
whether participants had previously been in
contact with mental health services.
Self-report measures
Table 2 shows the comparison of the self-report
measure scores for the high-risk and low-risk
groups. As intended, there was a significant
difference between the hypomanic personality
scores for the participants of the low-risk and
high-risk groups (UB0.001, N1 14, N2 14,
pB.001). High-risk participants scored higher on
the ISS perceived conflict, t(26) 3.938, p .001,
and activation subscales, t(26) 2.162, p .040.
Autobiographical memory recall
Inter-rater reliability. A random sample of 10%
of the AMT responses was analysed by an
independent rater. The first response latencies
recorded by the experimenter and rater were
highly correlated (rho .966, N 30, pB.001), as
were the cumulative response latencies (rho 
.979, N 30, pB.001). There were no significant
differences between the latencies recorded by the
experimenter and the independent rater for the
first (U 400, N1 30, N2 30, p .460) or
cumulative response times to recall of specific
memories (U 399, N1 30, N2 30, p .451).
There was no significant difference between
the raters for the classification of memories
as ‘‘Specific’’ or ‘‘General’’ (x
2 0.333, df 1,
TABLE1
Demographic variables of high-risk and low-risk participants
Demographics
High-risk
participants
Low-risk
participants
Gender 4m/10f 2m/12f
Mean age (SD) 22.00 years (4.90) 19.64 years (2.24)
Previous service
contact*
4 (28.57%) 1 (7.14%)
Ethnicity
Asian/Asian British 2 (14.29%) 2 (14.29%)
Chinese/Other 2 (14.29%)  
White 10 (71.23%) 12 (85.71%)
*Number of participants with previous contact with mental
health services.
18 DELDUCA, JONES, BARNARDp .564, 2-tailed). Within the sample, inter-rater
agreement was 93.33% (k 0.877).
Category of memory recall. Table 3 illustrates
the number of times each category of memory was
recalled initially in response to the cue words. The
total number of specific memories, general mem-
ories, and memories that were not recalled are
shown. The comparisons of the categories of
memories recalled for all the cue words as well
as the pleasant and unpleasant words separately
are also shown. The data for memories recalled in
response to all the cue words required normalising
using a square root transformation. The data for
the pleasant memories could not be normalised.
No difference was found between groups in
specificity of memories recalled for all the cue
words combined, F(1, 28) 2.696, p .114. Also,
a U test showed that there was no group
difference for the pleasant cue words alone
(U 84.500, N1 14, N2 14, p .501). In con-
trast, a higher proportion of specific memories
were recalled by the high-risk group in response
to the unpleasant cue words, F(1, 28) 5.400, p 
.029
Speed of memory recall
First response latencies. First response latencies
are the times (in seconds) taken by participants to
recall a memory in response to the cue words. The
data for the first response latencies were normal-
ised using a log transformation. Table 4 shows the
mean first response latencies for each group.
The combined first response latencies for all
cue words were significantly shorter in the high-
risk group, F(1, 23) 4.494, p .045. The same
pattern was also observed for first response times
to unpleasant cue words, F(1, 23) 4.473, p .045.
The first response latencies for pleasant cue
TABLE2
HPS and self-report scores of mood/coping strategies for high-risk and low-risk participants
High-risk participants Low-risk participants
Self-report measure Mean SD Mean SD
HPS 28.43 4.82 8.07 3.83
ISS
Perceived conflict 169.27 46.66 103.36 41.77
Well-being 136.29 29.28 149.43 46.23
Activation 197.21 83.16 130.16 80.95
Depression index 59.14 43.37 37.93 27.45
TABLE3
Number of memories recalled
High-risk participants Low-risk participants All participants
Category of memories
recalled Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
All cue words
Specific 7.71 (77.7%) 1.86 7.29 (72.9%) 1.33 7.50 (75.3%) 1.60
General 2.21 (22.3%) 1.72 2.36 (23.6%) 1.55 2.29 (22.9%) 1.61
Not recalled 0 (0.0%) 0 0.36 (3.6%) 0.50 0.19 (1.8%) 0.39
Pleasant cue words
Specific 3.71 (74.3%) 1.27 4.07 (81.4%) 0.93 3.89 (77.9%) 1.10
General 1.29 (25.7%) 1.27 0.79 (15.7%) 0.80 1.04 (20.7%) 1.07
Not recalled 0 (0.0%) 0 0.14 (2.9%) 0.36 0.07 (1.4%) 0.26
Unpleasant cue words
Specific 4.00 (81.2%) 0.96 3.21 (64.3%) 1.12 3.61 (72.7%) 1.10
General 0.93 (18.8%) 0.92 1.57 (31.4%) 1.22 1.25 (25.2%) 1.11
Not recalled 0 (0.0%) 0 0.21 (4.3%) 0.43 0.11 (2.2%) 0.31
Number of memories of each category recalled for all cue words, pleasant cue words, and unpleasant cue words for high-risk,
low-risk, and all participants.
SPECIFICITY OF AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY 19words were not significantly different between
the two groups, F(1, 24) 3.462, p .075, but
showed a trend towards the high-risk group
recalling memories in response to the pleasant
cue words faster than the low-risk group.
Cumulative response latencies. Cumulative re-
sponse latencies represent the time (in seconds)
taken by participants to recall a specific memory
for each word. This time is either equivalent to
the first response latencies if a specific memory
was recalled directly in reply to a cue word, or
consists of the first response latency combined
with the subsequent time(s) taken to recall a
specific memory after the prompt(s). The data for
the cumulative response latencies were normal-
ised using a log transformation. Table 5 shows the
mean cumulative response latencies for the each
group.
A significant difference between the groups for
the total cumulative latencies taken to reach
specific memories for all the cue words was
found, F(1, 23) 4.976, p .036, with the high-
risk group recalling specific memories more
quickly. The high-risk group also recalled specific
unpleasant (but not pleasant) memories signifi-
cantly faster than the low-risk group, F(1, 23) 
7.456, p .012.
Recency of recalled memories
There were no significant differences found
between the recency of the memories that were
TABLE4
First response latencies for high-risk participants, low-risk participants, and total for all participants (seconds)
High-risk participants Low-risk participants All participants
Cue word Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
All cue words 8.83 8.46 14.00 14.72 11.42 12.27
Pleasant cue words 9.01 9.26 14.00 14.09 11.50 12.14
Unpleasant cue words 8.65 7.63 14.00 15.43 11.34 12.45
TABLE5
Cumulative response latencies for high-risk, low-risk, and all participants (seconds)
High-risk participants Low-risk participants All participants
Cue word Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
All cue words 11.43 12.38 16.90 17.05 14.18 15.13
Pleasant cue words 12.58 14.41 15.98 15.60 14.28 15.06
Unpleasant cue words 10.27 9.89 17.83 18.46 14.08 15.26
TABLE6
Recency scores for recalled memories
High-risk participants Low-risk participants Total
Cue word Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Happy 2.57 1.95 3.64 2.10 3.11 2.06
Safe 2.92 1.98 3.57 2.28 3.25 2.12
Interested 2.14 1.56 2.29 2.23 2.21 1.89
Successful 3.29 1.68 3.50 1.87 3.39 1.75
Surprised 3.64 1.82 3.57 2.21 3.61 1.99
Sorry 3.21 1.97 2.79 2.29 3.00 2.11
Angry 3.50 2.03 2.79 2.26 3.14 2.14
Clumsy 2.21 1.97 2.57 2.06 2.39 1.99
Hurt 4.00 1.92 4.00 2.45 4.00 2.16
Lonely 2.86 1.96 3.93 1.98 3.39 2.01
20 DELDUCA, JONES, BARNARDgiven by each group for any of the cue words.
Table 6 shows the mean recency scores for each of
the cue words for each group.
DISCUSSION
Many studies have reported overgeneral memory
biases in depression. To date, the specificity of
autobiographical memory recall in bipolar dis-
order has been studied very little. Investigations
by Scott et al. (2000) and Mansell and Lam (2004)
suggest that remitted bipolar patients (likely to be
experiencing subsyndromal symptoms of depres-
sion) recalled more general than specific mem-
ories, especially for negative memories. Tzemou
and Birchwood (2007) found that a mixed group
of acutely depressed or manic bipolar patients
recalled overgeneral memories, but gave more
specific memories when not in an episode. The
present results extend these findings by demon-
strating that increased specificity can occur in
response to negative cue words in a group at high
risk of developing the condition. In addition,
previous research has found that depressed pa-
tients are slower at retrieving positive memories
than controls, rather than being faster at retriev-
ing negative memories (Williams & Broadbent,
1986b; Williams & Scott, 1988). The current
experiment shows the opposite pattern. Our
high-risk group exhibited not just increased
availability of specific memories to unpleasant
cue words but also more rapid access to them.
Demographic variables
As HPS scores were not related to the demo-
graphic variables the groups were comparable, as
they only differed in levels of hypomanic person-
ality; i.e., there were no extraneous socio-eco-
nomic factors that could have influenced the
results. There were no confounds due to previous
treatment that could have affected memory
retrieval, as only age related to the number of
previous contacts with mental health services,
which is as would be expected during the course
of a lifetime. Although not significantly different,
the high-risk group had a greater number of
previous contacts with mental health services
than the low-risk group, which may prove to be
consistent with their status as ‘‘high risk’’ but
cannot be determined with the size of the current
sample.
One factor that was not formally screened for
was the linguistic fluency of participants. This
variable would be worth investigating in a larger-
scale replication of the present research in case
differential fluency might impact on performance.
Self-report measures
The self-report measures were consistent with the
assumption that the high HPS scorers share some
processing characteristics with the clinical symp-
toms of mania. This group reported significantly
more putatively mania-related mood symptoms
(ISS perceived conflict and activation) than low
scorers. Importantly, they did not differ in terms
of depressive symptoms (ISS well-being or de-
pression index). However, as the subscales mea-
suring depressive symptoms had few items
compared to the subscales measuring manic
symptoms, it is possible that more subtle differ-
ences in depressive symptoms might have been
missed.
Autobiographical Memory Test
The effect of hypomanic personality on the
specificity of autobiographical memory recall
was analysed by comparing the categories of
memories retrieved in response to the AMT cue
words by each group. There was no reliable effect
of hypomanic personality on the specificity of
recall of pleasant memories or of the memory set
overall. In contrast, high-risk participants recalled
more specific unpleasant memories than the low-
risk group. The proportions of specific memories
recalled by each group suggests that there may
have been an interaction between cue word
valence and group; i.e., the proportion of specific
memories recalled in response to pleasant cue
words by the high-risk group (74.3%) is lower
than that for the low-risk group (81.4%), whereas
the opposite is true for unpleasant memories
(81.2% for the high-risk group compared to
64.3% for the low-risk group). However, this
could not be tested, as the data set for the
pleasant cue words could not be normalised.
The overall pattern is consistent with an
experiential thinking style in the high-risk group
that is marked only when processing unpleasant
cues. This partially supports Barnard et al.’s
(2006) prediction that the processing mode is
focused on an experiential mode of attending to
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this context, it is perhaps significant to note that
our high-risk group did not show elevated levels
of well-being but did show elevated levels of
perceived conflict and activation relative to the
low-risk group. This opens up the possibility that
the high-risk group could have been no more
likely than the low-risk group to have been
elaborating positive self models at or around the
time of test, with consequential lower availability
of specific information relevant to positive cues.
The results contrast with Scott et al.’s (2000)
and Mansell and Lam’s (2004) findings indicating
that remitted bipolar patients (likely to be ex-
periencing subsyndromal symptoms of depres-
sion) recall more general than specific
memories, particularly negative memories, than
healthy controls and remitted unipolar patients.
Consistent with the possibility of a mood-related
effect, Mansell and Lam (2004) also found that
the remitted bipolar group recalled negative
memories more frequently during everyday life
than controls. We did not record everyday life
recall in this study, so it is not possible to say
whether the higher rate of recall of specific
unpleasant memories in the high-risk group was
also associated with the frequency effect observed
by Mansell and Lam (2004) for their clinical
participants. Tzemou and Birchwood (2007)
found that bipolar and unipolar participants who
reported more overgeneral memories experi-
enced fewer distressing intrusive memories. This
finding is consistent with Conway and Pleydell-
Pearce’s (2000) model, which argues that the
recall of specific unpleasant memories might
indicate a failure to protect the self from the
harmful effects of recalling negative self-referring
knowledge. Our data are consistent with the idea
that this mechanism could well be in place in
healthy individuals at risk for bipolar disorder.
Analysis of the first response and cumulative
response latencies showed that the high-risk group
retrieved specific memories faster than the low-
risk group. Separate analyses of the first response
latencies and cumulative response latencies for
pleasant and unpleasant cue words showed that
this effect was apparent in faster recall of un-
pleasant (but not pleasant) memories by the
high-risk group, which would suggest increased
availability of stored memories of this type. This
would also be consistent with greater use of an
experiential mode of processing in individuals
with high levels of hypomanic personality who
would be less likely to evaluate the content of
specific propositions.
The relative speed of recall of pleasant and
unpleasant memories found in this study contrasts
with the pattern of recall found by Williams and
Broadbent (1986b) in suicidal patients. The suici-
dal patients had delayed recall of positive mem-
ories, rather than speeded recall of negative
memories, as was found in this study. Thus it
seems that suicidal participants may have im-
paired access to positive memories, whereas our
high-risk participants appeared to have enhanced
access to negative memories. This pattern is
also consistent with a manic-defence/depression
avoidance model (Bentall, 2003; Neale, 1988) in
which hypo(manic) experiences are recruited as a
means of avoiding painful negative affect.
An alternative interpretation of the differences
in response speeds could be that the high-risk
participants are generally faster responders, in-
dependent of task type. Although the discrepancy
between response time to positive and negative
memories suggests this might be unlikely, it would
be wise in future research to include a control
task, such as a semantic word association or
object-naming task, to evaluate response latency
independent of AMT performance. Conversely,
the low-risk group may have simply demonstrated
a delayed retrieval of memories in response to
negative cues. This would be consistent with a
general ‘‘healthy’’ bias towards the recall of
positive personal memories, as assumed by Con-
way and Pleydell-Pearce’s (2000) model. The
high-risk group may lack this capability and
therefore does not display the same pattern of
retrieval.
In addition, the response latencies that were
recorded may have been affected by any differ-
ences in the linguistic fluency of the participants
in each group, as this variable was not formally
assessed. However, in only one instance in this
study was it apparent that any participant had
problems comprehending the meaning of a cue
word: one member of the high-risk group did not
understand the meaning of the word ‘‘Clumsy’’
and these data were removed from the analysis. It
is also highly unlikely that more subtle fluency
differences would lead to the observed group
differences in response rates to specific unplea-
sant memories in particular. However, formal
assessment of any impact of linguistic fluency on
task performance would be a worthwhile element
for future replications or extensions of the pre-
sent study.
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gories of memory recall and response latencies
indicates that the high-risk group had increased
specificity of autobiographical memories compared
to the low-risk group. The high number of specific
memories recalled by the analogue sample con-
flicts with previous findings, which used clinically
diagnosed bipolar patients who retrieved a higher
ratio of general to specific memories. However,
both this study and clinically based studies
demonstrate that the specificity effect was clear-
est for negative memories. It may therefore be
the case that a risk factor for bipolar disorder is
associated with the recollection of negative
memories.
Previous research indicates that depression
involves the slower recall of positive memories,
which are retrieved as more overgeneral than
negative memories. In this study an elevated risk
of developing hypomania was found to involve
the speeded recall of negative memories, which
are recollected more specifically than positive
memories. Therefore both cases involve faster
and more specific recall of negative compared to
positive memories, but this occurs to a greater
extent in those with an increased likelihood of
hypomania. This is supported by the finding that
cognitive vulnerabilities found within bipolar
disorder and unipolar depression are largely
similar (Scott et al., 2000). Thus, the feature that
distinguishes whether hypomania/mania or de-
pression arises during a bipolar episode may be
the availability and specificity of autobiographical
information that can be used as a comparison
when interpreting current situations. However,
although the numbers of specific memories re-
called by both groups in this study were similar to
those of Barnard et al. (2006), who also used an
analogue sample, these results were much higher
than the number reported in studies using clinical
samples. This suggests that there may be a crucial
difference in cognitive processing between those
at risk and those who eventually develop bipolar
disorder.
Key findings
Previous research has indicated that remitted
bipolar patients display an overgeneral memory
bias. This study found that participants who were
at risk but had not been clinically diagnosed with
bipolar disorder exhibited an overspecific mem-
ory bias. In this study, and previous studies, the
effect was found to be greater for negative than
positive memories. Therefore the recall of nega-
tive memories is likely to play a key role in
bipolar disorder. The difference in the direction
of the biases found suggests that the effects of
subsyndromal depressive symptoms and past
episodes of depression impact on the cognitive
processes used by patients.
Compared to depression, the specificity and
speed of memory recall may increase with the risk
of hypomania, indicating greater availability of
stored memories of this type. As the memory
recall is facilitated, this could further expand the
chance that specific memories are called to mind.
This suggests that hypomanic traits are linked to a
more experiential mode of processing. As pre-
vious research has found that the frequency of
recollection of unpleasant intrusive memories in
everyday life impacts on the specificity of recall, it
may be that experiential processing (which facil-
itates semantic elaboration of current experiences
in relation to stored information) increases the
availability of negative personal memories for
retrieval. As a result, hypomanic traits may
develop to counteract the impact of recalling
information that poses a threat to the person’s
sense of self. It is unclear why this facilitation of
recall should occur just for negative memories,
and therefore warrants further investigation.
The results of this study partially support
Barnard et al.’s (2006) prediction, based on the
assumptions of the ICS model, that patients with
bipolar disorder would display reduced levels of
overgeneral memories during hypomanic epi-
sodes. The findings only upheld this assumption
for unpleasant memories, hence more stringent
criteria regarding the occurrence of the proposed
effect need to be formulated and investigated.
The current results reinforce the likely signifi-
cance of negative material in hypomania specifi-
cally under circumstances where well-being is not
substantially elevated. Further clarification of the
relationships between attention to meaning on
the one hand and the role of positive self-models
and well-being on the other would be one obvious
target for future empirical work.
Limitations
The cue words used within the AMT have not
been tested for their relevance to bipolar dis-
order. It is possible that bipolar-significant posi-
tively valenced words may have facilitated the
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combining this study with an extended version of
the cue words used by Mansell and Lam (2004) in
future work could give greater insight into the
dysfunctional assumptions found within hypoma-
nia/mania. Furthering this, the content of the
memories could be analysed to highlight potential
underlying themes that affect autobiographical
memory recall. The inclusion of a set of non-
emotive control words would also show whether
the recall of emotional memories in particular is
affected by hypomania or if the memory retrieval
process as a whole is distorted.
The imageability of the cue words was addi-
tionally not accounted for. Previous research has
shown that the recall of specific memories is
facilitated in response to words for which a
mental image is easily produced compared to
cues that do not involve imagery (Mansell &
Lam, 2004; Williams, Healy, & Ellis, 1999), as
vivid images are important in defining event-
specific knowledge within the autobiographical
knowledge base (Conway & Pleydell-Pearce,
2000). Therefore the imageability of the cues
may have affected the search and retrieval
strategies used to recall the memories. This
should be controlled for in future work if possible.
The absence of a depressed group means that
the differences in the memory recall of the groups
cannot be fully attributed to the presence of
hypomanic traits. The same findings may have
been found for participants showing depressive
tendencies, in which instance the findings might
be due to particular characteristics that can be
found within all mood disorders.
As this is only a preliminary study using a
relatively small number of emotionally valenced
cue words, the results must be considered with
caution. As previous research studies investigating
autobiographical memory recall in depression
have shown, the direction of the valence effect of
cue words is not consistent. Williams et al.’s (2007)
review reported that memories tend to be more
overgeneral in response to positive than negative
cues but that this is not always the case. A similar
discrepancy can be found when considering the
inconsistent findings of previous studies looking at
the specificity of autobiographical memory recall
inrelationto mania andhypomania. Thereforethe
results of this study would need further replication
before the valence effect found here could be
interpreted confidently.
Implications
This study suggests that dysfunctional memory
recall within bipolar disorder may be more
related to depression than has been previously
thought; i.e., both involve faster and more specific
recall of negative than positive memories. There-
fore it may be of use in future studies to examine
the similarities between these mood disorders
rather than the differences. It may be possible to
devise a single therapeutic technique that could
be used to promote more adaptive thought
processes and memory recall among all of the
phases of bipolar disorder. This could potentially
also be adapted for unipolar depression. By
focusing on modifying the schema that are
produced within each phase of bipolar disorder,
more functional cognitive processes could be
encouraged. For example, by promoting the
retrieval of specific positive memories and the
integration of negative memories into the auto-
biographical knowledge base, a more adaptive
focus of attention could be endorsed, which may
help to prevent and reduce the severity of
episodes.
Conclusion
There is still limited understanding of the key
psychological processes underpinning bipolar dis-
order. If the results of this preliminary study are
replicated, the observation of enhanced access
towards negative specific memories in individuals
at risk for bipolar disorder might help to inform
further developments in appropriate clinical tech-
niques for individuals at risk and those who have a
clinical diagnosis of bipolar disorder. Additional
investigation into the effects of hypomania on
autobiographical memory may further highlight
the key factors that differentiate whether mania or
depressionisproducedbytheunderlyingproblems
and determine whether those with a behavioural
risk eventually develop bipolar disorder or not.
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